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"VALIDLY ADOPTED INTERPRETATIONS":
DEFINING THE DEFERENCE STANDARD IN
AVIATION CERTIFICATE ACTION APPEALS
Denise A. Banaszewski*
Abstract: The split-enforcement model of agency administration creates a dilemma for the
adjudicating agency regarding how much deference it should allot interpretive documents
promulgated by the agency with rulemaking authority. In 1992, Congress sought to resolve
this problem in the area of aviation safety by statutorily mandating that the adjudicating
agency, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), defer to "validly adopted"
interpretations generated by the rulemaking agency, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA). Ironically, the statute created even more uncertainty because the term "validly
adopted" is vague and remains undefined. Subsequent decisions have not clarified exactly
when the NTSB considers itself bound. This Comment examines the realm of possible FAA
interpretations that could be determined to be "validly adopted" in the context of aviation
safety certificate action appeals. This Comment argues that regardless of form, FAA
interpretations that meet uniformity and notice criteria and are not arbitrary or capricious
should be considered "validly adopted" and bind the NTSB.

Aviation safety is administered according to the split-enforcement
model, which involves two federal agencies administering one particular
industry or area. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), a
component of the Department of Transportation, is the primary
administrative agency in aviation safety. The FAA performs two
regulatory functions: promulgating Federal Aviation Regulations in
accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and enforcing
those regulations. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), an
independent agency, fulfills three roles in aviation safety: investigating
accidents,2 making safety recommendations to the Secretary of
Transportation after determining the probable cause of accidents,3 and
conducting de novo appellate review of FAA safety enforcement orders.4
This separation of functions complicates interpretive issues. As the
rulemaking agency, the FAA's responsibilities include interpreting its
own rules and regulations.5 In fact, most FAA field offices receive daily
Commercial pilot; B.B.A., Aviation Administration, University of North Dakota.
1. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1994, Supp. 11995 & Supp. 111996).
2. 49 U.S.C. § 1131(a)(1)(A) (1994).
3. 49 U.S.C. § 1131(a)(1)(A).
4. 49 U.S.C. § 1133 (1994).
5. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 153 (1990)
(holding interpretive power rests with administrative agency possessing familiarity and
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requests for interpretations of regulations. 6 To fulfill its interpretation
responsibility, the FAA produces a variety of documents, including
interpretive rules, Advisory Circulars, opinion letters, and memos. As the
appellate adjudicating body in certificate actions, the extent to which the
NTSB must defer to these interpretations is unclear.
Congress attempted to clarify the deference standard in the FAA Civil
Penalty Administrative Assessment Act of 1992 (Civil Penalty Act).7 The
Act directs that the NTSB, when adjudicating aviation safety
enforcement actions, shall be bound by all "validly adopted" FAA
interpretations not "arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not according to
law." 8 The term "validly adopted" has not been defined by Congress,
courts, the NTSB, or the FAA. Thus, the question remains: which
interpretations should be recognized as "validly adopted" and, as such,
bind the NTSB?
Validly adopted interpretations could conceivably fall anywhere on a
continuum ranging from any statement, in any context, addressing the
meaning of a rule, to only those interpretations promulgated in
accordance with the notice and comment provisions of the APA.9 The
degree of deference accorded FAA interpretations should be resolved for
the benefit of both agencies and the affected public, each of which
deserves some certainty about which FAA interpretations will provide
reliable guidance to future NTSB decisions.
This Comment explores possible definitions of "validly adopted" and
recommends which FAA interpretations should bind the NTSB in
accordance with the relevant provisions of the Civil Penalty Act. This
Comment argues that interpretations that are substantively fair (not
policymaking expertise); see also 51 Fed. Reg. 46,985,46,986 (1986); Administrative Conference of
the United States, Recommendations and Reports 1986, Recommendation 86-4: The SplitEnforcement Model for Agency Adjudication 20 [hereinafter ACUS Recommendation 86-4]
(describing that in split-enforcement scheme, adjudicating agency must defer to rulemaking agency's
interpretations).
6. Interview with Karl Lewis, Supervising Attorney, FAA, in Renton, Wash. (Feb. 20, 1998).
7. Pub. L. No. 102-345, 106 Stat. 923 (1992) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 44703, 44709,
46301(d) (1994)).
8. When conducting a hearing under this subsection, the Board is not bound by findings of fact
of the Administrator but is bound by all validly adopted interpretations of laws and regulations
the Administrator carries out and of written agency policy guidance available to the public
related to sanctions to be imposed under this section unless the Board finds an interpretation is
arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not according to law.
FAA Civil Penalty Administrative Assessment Act § 3(a)(1), 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d)(3).

9. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).

Validly Adopted FAA Interpretations
arbitrary or capricious) and procedurally fair (developed within the
agency as delegated by the Administrator and made widely available to
the public) should bind the NTSB.
Part I of this Comment gives an overview of the roles the NTSB and
FAA play in aviation safety administration. Part II explores general
deference principles and examines how the Civil Penalty Act affects the
deference the NTSB gives FAA interpretations in FAA certificate
actions. Part III defines the range of interpretations that could be
considered "validly adopted." Part IV proposes that, to be binding,
interpretations must be substantively and procedurally fair, meeting
specific uniformity" and notice requirements. This Comment concludes
that the NTSB should defer to FAA interpretations that meet public
notice requirements, are developed pursuant to authority delegated by the
Administrator, and are not arbitrary or capricious.
I.

OVERVIEW OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FAA
AND THE NTSB

The split-enforcement administrative structure is used by only a
minority of administrative agency organizations. Administrative agencies
typically engage in rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudication functions
when carrying out their policy formation and administration duties.11 In
most enforcement agencies, the same agency performs these three
functions, subject to internal "separation of functions" requirements." In
specific situations, Congress has carried the separation of functions one
step further by structuring agencies according to a "split-enforcement" or
"split-function" model. 3 Under this model, one agency performs the
rulemaking and enforcement functions, while an independent agency
performs the adjudication function. 4 In the split-enforcement model used
10. No guarantee exists that each FAA field office will interpret a specific Federal Aviation
Regulation the same way. Imposing uniformity by ensuring that regulations are interpreted in only
one way will ensure reliability and fairness.
11. See ACUS Recommendation 86-4, supra note 5, at 1S.
12. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1994); see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1994) (Federal Trade Commission);
47 U.S.C. §§ 151-159 (1994 & Supp. 11995) (Federal Communications Commission).
13. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1990). See
generally George Robert Johnson, Jr., The Split-Enforcement Model: Some Conclusionsfrom the
OSHA and MSHA Experiences, 39 Admin. L. Rev. 315 (1987).
14. Examples of areas administered according to the split-enforcement model include
occupational safety and health (with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration assigned the
rulemaking and enforcement functions and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
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to administer aviation safety, 5 the FAA performs the rulemaking and
enforcement functions in aviation safety certificate actions, 6 while the
NTSB carries out the appellate adjudication function. 7
A.

The FederalAviation Administration:Rulemaking andEnforcement

A component of the Department of Transportation, the FAA is the
primary agency that regulates the aviation industry. 8 Most importantly,
the FAA regulates aviation safety, 9 which has been highly regulated
since 1926.2" The FAA's responsibilities involve developing and

implementing aviation safety policy through two of its functions,
rulemaking and enforcement. 2'
assigned the adjudication function) and mine safety and health (with the Mine Safety and Health
Administration assigned rulemaking and enforcement functions and the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Review Commission assigned the adjudicatory function). See ACUS Recommendation 86-4,
supra note 5, at 18-19. In 1986, the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) "was
unable to conclude [that the split-enforcement] model achieves greater fairness in adjudication" than
the traditional model. Id. at 19.
15. This Comment focuses on the FAA-NTSB relationship as it applies to airmen, and more
specifically, FAA certificate actions against airmen. For example, certified pilots and mechanics are
airmen. In addition to actions against airmen, the FAA imposes civil penalties against non-airmen,
including uncertificated individuals and non-natural persons such as corporations and partnerships.
A civil penalty imposed against an airline passenger who smokes in an aircraft lavatory is an
example of a non-airmen civil penalty. See, e.g., Daniel S. Pippin, 1998 FAA LEXIS 312, Mar. 23,
1998. Unlike airmen cases, in non-airmen cases in which the civil penalty is equal to or less than
$50,000, the FAA carries out the rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudication functions. 14 C.F.R.
§ 13.16 (1998). Federal district courts adjudicate airmen and non-airmen cases involving civil
penalties over $50,000. 14 C.F.R. § 13.15(c)(5) (1998). For a discussion on certificate actions and
civil penalties, see infra notes 34-43 and accompanying text. "Airman" and "airmen" are terms used
by the FAA that include both men and women.
16. This relationship is also true for civil penalties imposed on airmen. For a definition and
discussion of certificate actions, see infra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
17. The adjudicatory powers exercised during certificate actions do not lie only with the NTSB.
The FAA also exercises adjudicatory authority when it issues an order, such as an Order of
Revocation. In this Comment, "adjudicatory function" and "adjudication" refer to the appellate
adjudicatory authority the NTSB exercises in certificate actions.
18. Office of the Federal Register & National Archives and Records Administration, The United
States Government Manual1997/98 418 (1997).
19. 49 U.S.C. § 40101(d) (1994) (giving FAA authority to regulate aviation safety); United States
Government Manual,supra note 18, at 418-19.
20. For history of aviation safety regulation, see generally Robert Burkhardt, The Federal
Aviation Administration (1967); Harry P. Wolfe & David A. NewMyer, Aviation Industry
Regulation (1985); and Paul Stephen Dempsey, The State of the Airline, Airport & Aviation
Industries,21 Transp. L.J. 129, 130-53 (1992).
21. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 106, 40101(d), 44709-44723 (1994) (granting FAA statutory authority in
area of aviation safety).

Validly Adopted FAA Interpretations
The FAA establishes and implements aviation safety policy primarily
through two interrelated rulemaking processes. First, the agency is
authorized by Congress to promulgate legislative rules, the Federal
Aviation Regulations (FARs).' The agency promulgates legislative rules
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).' Legislative rules "carry
the force of law" and bind the public and the agency.2 4 Because much
regulatory language tends to be vague, the FAA must both promulgate
and interpret the FARs.
Developing interpretations, which clarify and explain existing
regulations, is the FAA's second rulemaking role in aviation safety.
Because aviation safety depends on voluntary compliance with the
regulations,' the FAA achieves compliance primarily by ensuring that a
"clear awareness and understanding" of the regulations exists within the
aviation industry.26 It issues interpretations to clarify the meaning of the
FARs. The FAA develops and issues interpretations in a variety of
forms, including interpretive rules,27 Advisory Circulars," letters in

22. 49 U.S.C.S. § 106(f)(3)(A) (1997) (granting FAA rulemaking authority). For a discussion on
rulemaking, see generally Administrative Conference of the United States, A Guide to Federal
Agency Rulemaking (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter ACUS Guide], and 1 Kenneth Culp Davis & Richard
J. Pierce, Jr., AdministrativeLaw Treatisechs. 6-7 (3d ed. 1994).
23. The FAA promulgates informal rules under the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994) (outlining the
informal rulemaking process). The major requirement of informal rulemaking, also called "notice
and comment" rulemaking, is publication of the proposed rule in the Federal Register, which allows
for public notice with the opportunity to comment. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). As long as informal
interpretations only interpret existing rules or regulations without adding substantive content, these
interpretations are designated as "interpretive rules" according to the APA, and are exempt from the
requirements of § 553 rulemaking. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A). Other informal interpretations may not
fit neatly within the definition of interpretive rules if they are more like policy statements that do not
interpret, but only state policy. See ACUS Guide, supra note 22, at 47-69.
24. Joseph v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1140, 1154 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(stating that legislative rules have full force of law and bind court subject to arbitrary, capricious
standard but interpretive rules do not); see also Davis & Pierce, supra note 22, § 6.3, at 233, § 6.5,
at 250.
25. Compliance and Enforcement Program, F.A.A. Order No. 2150.3A, at 12 [hereinafter
Enforcement Handbook]; see also Federal Aviation Administration's Civil Penalties Program:
Hearing on H.R. 5481 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Pub. Works and
Transp., 102d Cong. 85 (1992) (statement of Pete West, President, Government Affairs, National
Business Aircraft Association) ("[A]s everyone here today knows, voluntary compliance is critical to
aviation safety.").
26. Enforcement Handbook supra note 25, at 12.
27. Interpretive rules are interpretations of regulations that are not subject to the notice and
comment provisions of the APA, but must be published in the Federal Register. 5 U.S.C.
§§ 552(a)(1)(D), 553(b)(3)(A) (1994). Interpretations that are not legislative rules, interpretive rules,
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response to interpretation inquiries (which could be generated from a
field office, a regional office, or the FAA Headquarters in Washington
D.C.), phone conversations, internal memoranda, and positions
developed in the course of litigation. The FAA issues a large number of
these interpretations in its effort to develop, implement, and explain
policy objectives.29 Some of these interpretations qualify as interpretive
rules30 and statements of policy 3' that, under the APA, are exempt from
the notice and comment provisions. 32 The APA prohibits interpretive
rules and policy statements from adversely affecting persons having no
actual notice of them unless they are published in the Federal Register.3 3
In addition to promulgating and interpreting regulations, the FAA
enforces the FARs. In the area of aviation safety, the FAA may pursue
two primary types of enforcement actions: certificate actions and civil
penalty actions.34 Certificate actions affect individuals and entities
possessing FAA certificates, which grant the holders certain privileges.
FAA certificates include airmen certificates (such as pilot and aircraft
mechanic certificates), 35 air agency certificates (including repair stations,
flight schools, and aircraft maintenance schools),36 and air carrier
certificates (airlines and aircraft charter companies).37 These certificated
individuals38 are subject either to certificate actions, in which the FAA
suspends or revokes privileges conferred by the certificate, or civil

or policy statements fall outside the APA, but this Comment includes them within the broad term
"interpretations."
28. See, e.g., Temporary Flight Restrictions (TFRs), AC No. 91-63B (Feb. 28, 1997).
29. FAA regulations occupy four inches of library shelf space, "but the corresponding technical
guidance materials [occupy) well in excess of forty feet." Peter L. Strauss, Comment, The
Rulemaking Continuum, 41 Duke L.J. 1463, 1469 (1992) (referring to facsimile from Neil Eisner,
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Transp. (Mar. 4, 1992)). Also, the FAA "generates
approximately 215 feet of domestic and international notices yearly." Id. at 1469 n.20.
30. See supra note 27.
31. Policy statements do not interpret, but advise the public as to how the agency intends to
exercise its discretionary power. ACUS Guide, supra note 22, at 58.
32. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (1994).
33. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) (1994).
34. See 14 C.F.R. pt. 13 (1998).
35. See 14 C.F.R. pts. 61, 63 (1998).
36. See 14 C.F.R. pts. 141-43, 145, 147 (1998).
37. See 14 C.F.R. pts. 119, 125 (1998). The FAA also issues certificates that do not grant the
holder privileges, such as airworthiness certificates issued to aircrafL See 14 C.F.R. pt. 21 (1998).
38. Although enforcement actions may be brought against air agencies and air carriers, this
Comment focuses on certificate actions against airmen.

Validly Adopted FAA Interpretations
penalty actions.39 When an airman violates an FAR, the FAA prefers to
take certificate action against the airman.4" For example, FAA actions
involving pilots could result in a suspension or revocation 4' of the
individual's pilot certificate for up to one year.42 During the period of

suspension or revocation, the pilot may not exercise her flight
privileges.43
Alternatively, the FAA may enforce the FARs by imposing civil
penalties." When a certificate action will put the certificate holder out of
business, the FAA prefers to impose a civil penalty. For example, in the
case of air carriers, the FAA will take civil penalty action if a
"substantial adverse impact on the public interest from disrupted service"
would occur as a result of certificate action as long as "this impact is not
outweighed by safety considerations."45 In addition, violators who do not
possess an FAA certificate will be subject to civil penalties. For example,
the FAA may impose a civil penalty upon a person who shipped
hazardous materials by air and did not label the packaging in compliance
with the Department of Transportation hazardous materials regulations.4 6
To culminate its enforcement function, the FAA issues orders.47 In a
certificate action, the FAA issues a Notice of Proposed Certificate
Action.4" At this point the airman may either surrender her certificate,49

39. EnforcementHandbook,supra note 25, at 24.
40. Id.
41. 49 U.S.C. § 44709(b) (1994) (authorizing Administrator's suspension and revocation power).
A suspension takes away the airman's certificate privileges for a specified period of time, such as 30
days. At the end of the suspension period, the pilot is free to exercise his certificate privileges.
"Suspension action is appropriate where there is a need temporarily to suspend the privileges of the
certificate pending demonstration of qualification." Enforcement Handbook supra note 25, at 25.
Revocation is the more serious action. "Revocation of a certificate is used... when the certificate
holder lacks the necessary qualifications to hold the certificate. The continued exercise of the
privileges of the certificate in such circumstances would be contrary to safety in air commerce or air
transportation." Id. If a certificate is revoked, after one year the pilot must retake and pass the
appropriate oral and practical tests to have her certificate reissued. See 14 C.F.R. § 61.13(g) (1998).
42. See 14 C.F.R. § 61.13(g).
43. 14 C.F.R. § 61.13 (1998).
44. See 49 U.S.C. § 46301 (1994).
45. Enforcement Handbook supranote 25, at 24.
46. 49 C.F.R. pts. 171-172 (1997).
47. This is an example of the FAA exercising its adjudicatory power. See supra note 17.
48. 14 C.F.R. § 13.19(b) (1998); EnforcementHandbook, supra note 25, at 139-40.
49. 14 C.F.R. § 13.19(c)(1) (1998).
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answer the charges in writing," or request an informal conference." If
the issue is not settled, the FAA will issue an Order of Suspension or
Order of Revocation, as appropriate. 2 The Order constitutes final FAA
action, and may be appealed to the NTSB. 3
B.

The NationalTransportationSafety Board: Adjudication
As the adjudicating body for FAA certificate action appeals, the

NTSB's position is similar to that of a reviewing court with the power of
de novo review." When an FAA Order is appealed, an NTSB
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) hears the matter and then issues an
Initial Decision and Order affirming, amending, modifying, or reversing
the FAA Order.55 If either party is dissatisfied with the ALJ's Decision
and Order, that party may appeal to the full Board. 6 After reviewing the
record, the Board issues an Opinion and Order. 7 Finally, if either side
remains dissatisfied, that party may appeal to a federal court of appeals.5
Some NTSB adjudications of certificate action and civil penalty
appeals59 pose questions of FAR interpretation. As the adjudicating body,
the Board must determine if the FAA's interpretation should stand.

50. 14 C.F.R. § 13.19(c)(2) (1998).
51. 14 C.F.R. § 13.19(c)(4) (1998). Airmen civil penalty actions follow a similar process. The
FAA issues a Notice of Proposed Civil Penalty and the violator may either pay or challenge the
penalty. 14 C.F.R. § 13.16(d) (1998).
52. 14 C.F.1. § 13.19(c) (1998). In civil penalty cases, the FAA issues a Final Notice of Civil
Penalty. 14 C.F.R. § 13.16(e) (1998).
53. 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d)(1) (1994); 14 C.F.R. § 13.19(d) (1998). Airmen civil penalties may also
be appealed to the NTSB. 49 U.S.C. § 46301(d)(5)(B) (1994).
54. Hinson v. NTSB, 57 F.3d 1144, 1147 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The NTSB's position is the same
for airmen civil penalty appeals. See supranotes 15-16.
55. 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d)(1); Enforcement Handbook, supra note 25, at 142-43. The ALI's
decision is "not... precedent binding on the Board." 49 C.F.R. § 821.43 (1997).
56. 49 U.S.C. § 1133 (1994); EnforcementHandbook,supra note 25, at 143.
57. 49 C.F.R. § 821.49(b) (1997).
58. 49 U.S.C. § 44709(0 (1994).
59. Certificate action and civil penalty appeals by airmen follow the same adjudicatory process.
See 49 U.S.C. §§ 44709, 46301 (1994).
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II.

NTSB DEFERENCE TO FAA INTERPRETATIONS

A.

The JudicialStandardof Deference to InformalInterpretations

The degree of judicial deference owed to agency interpretations
differs depending on whether the agency is interpreting a statute or its
own regulation. An agency regulation promulgated under specific
statutory grants of rulemaking authority is called a "legislative rule."'
Regulations issued by the agency that interpret specific statutory
provisions are one type of legislative rule. For example, Congress
authorizes the FAA to regulate air traffic operations in navigable
airspace. 6 In interpreting this statutory provision, the FAA promulgated
a regulation that requires pilots to obtain permission from the appropriate
air traffic control center before entering designated Class B airspace,62
which tends to have a high volume of air traffic. These legislative rules
(or regulations) carry the force of law, whereas agencies' interpretations
of their own regulations do not."
Courts give legislative rules great deference. 4 In Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court
articulated a two-step process to be used in determining whether a court
should defer to a legislative rule.6 ' First, courts must determine whether
the statute exhibits clear Congressional intent.' If Congress has spoken
with clear intent, the agency must give effect to that intent and any
contradictory agency interpretation must fail. 7 Second, if Congress has

60. Davis & Pierce, supra note 22, § 6.3, at 234.

61. 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(2) (1994).
62. 14 C.F.R. § 91.131 (1998).
63. Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 336 n.8 (1995) ("[l]nterpretive rulings do not have
the force and effect of regulations .... ."); Joseph v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 554 F.2d
1140, 1154 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (stating that legislative rules have full force of law and bind court
subject to arbitrary, capricious standard but interpretive rules do not); Davis & Pierce, supra note 22,
§ 6.3, at 233-34, 236.
64. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996) (emphasizing that Court defers
to reasonable judgments of agencies' interpretations of ambiguous terms in statutes they administer);
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)
(declaring that Supreme Court has traditionally given considerable weight to agency interpretations
of statute that agency is entrusted to administer).
65. 467 U.S. at 842-43.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 843 n.9. Some commentators have suggested that Congress is almost never "clear," and
therefore the Chevron doctrine in effect accords administrative interpretations a default stance,
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not spoken, the question becomes whether the agency construction of the
statute is a reasonable or "permissible" construction." The courts should
not determine whether the agency interpretation is the only or best
interpretation, but whether it is a reasonable interpretation. 9 According
to Chevron, if the interpretation is reasonable, and not arbitrary or
capricious, it should be upheld.70
Courts have traditionally allotted agency interpretations of legislative
rules less deference than legislative rules themselves. 7' Whether this is
true today is less certain. Originally, in the 1944 landmark case Skidmore
v. Swift, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that an agency's interpretation of
its own regulation has persuasive, not controlling authority, and its
persuasive weight depends upon "the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier
and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control."72 Determining the level of
persuasiveness given an interpretive rule entailed weighing these factors.
Since the Chevron decision, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has
given Chevron-type deference to interpretations that were not legislative
rules.73 In Thomas Jefferson University Hospital v. Shalala, the Court
held that it must give "substantial deference to an agency's interpretation
of its own regulations," and its interpretation is controlling unless it is
unreasonable.74 The Court then reviewed the interpretation by the
"arbitrary, capricious" standard as outlined in the APA.75 This analysis

where courts defer to agency interpretations unless Congress has been clear. See Thomas W. Merrill,
JudicialDeference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L.J. 969, 990 (1992).
68. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
69. Idl at 843 n.11.

70. Id. at 844.
71. Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 157 (1990)
("Although not entitled to the same deference as norms that derive from the exercise of... delegated
lawmaking powers, these informal interpretations are still entitled to some weight on judicial
review.").
72. 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
73. See, e.g., Martin,499 U.S. at 150 (noting it is well established that agency's construction of
its own regulations is entitled to substantial deference) (citing Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939
(1986)); Prater v. United States Parole Comm'n, 802 F.2d 948 (7th Cir. 1986); Robert A. Anthony,
Which Agency InterpretationsShould Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 Yale . on Reg. 1, 55-63
(1990).
74. 512 U.s. 504,512(1994).
75. Id. at 512-14; see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).

646

Validly Adopted FAA Interpretations
appears to follow the reasonableness and non-arbitrariness standards
outlined in Chevron rather than the factorial analysis of Skidmore.
Thomas Jefferson represents a departure from Skidmore, which did not
grant such interpretations controlling weight, but only persuasive weight
that fell on a sliding scale. Although later in Thomas Jefferson the Court
stated that an interpretation should be given less weight if it is
inconsistent with prior interpretations 76-- hinting at Skidmore
treatment-the Court emphasized that the agency has the prerogative of
changing an interpretation and "where an agency's interpretation of [its
regulation] is at least as plausible as competing ones, there is little, if
any, reason not to defer to its construction."" This again indicates that
courts should confer Chevron treatment to interpretations that are not
legislative rules. Therefore, the degree of judicial deference accorded to
interpretations of regulations appears to be moving up from Skidmore
levels toward Chevron levels.
B.

The Administrative StandardWithin the Split-Enforcement Model

In 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of regulatory
interpretation in a split-enforcement model. In Martin v. Occupational
Safety andHealth Review Commission, the Court specifically considered
to which agency's interpretation an adjudicating court should defer.78
The Martin Court confronted two conflicting interpretations of a
regulation promulgated by the Secretary of Labor under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970:"9 one by the Secretary of Labor and the
other by the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
(OSHRC). The Court held that reviewing courts should defer to the
interpretation articulated by the Secretary of Labor, the rulemaking
agency, and not the OSHRC, the reviewing agency.80 The Court reasoned
that because Congress did not place lawmaking and policymaking power
with the OSHRC, it would not allow the OSHRC to use its adjudicatory

76. Thomas Jefferson, 512 U.S. at 515.
77. Id. at 517 (citing Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402,417 (1993)).
78. 499 U.S. 144. Martin involved the Secretary of Labor and the OSHRC. The Court expressly
limited its decision to that particular relationship under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970. Id. at 157.
79. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678

(1994)).
80. Martin,499 U.S. at 152-53.
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powers to make policy."1 The Court went on to state that the OSHRC's
adjudicatory role was akin to that of a court, and it could only review the
Secretary's interpretations of the Secretary's own regulations for
"consistency with the regulatory language and for reasonableness. 8 2
This indicated Chevron-level deference. Thus, according to Martin, the
adjudicating agency should accord rulemaking agency interpretations the
deference a court would accord interpretations under Chevron.
C.

Evolution ofFAA-NTSB DeferentialStandards

For two reasons, aviation safety currently employs a deference
standard unique even among agencies structured according to the splitenforcement model. First, the Civil Penalty Act 3 statutorily mandates
that the NTSB defer to FAA interpretations.' This is unique because
other agencies do not have a statutory deference directive. Second, the
statute adopts a novel standard. The NTSB is bound only by "validly
adopted" interpretations that are not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to
law. 5 Although it attempted to clarify which agency held interpretive
power, Congress only clouded the issue by using the words "validly
adopted." Congress did not define "validly adopted" and no other agency
uses this deference standard.
1.

Pre-StatutoryDeference

Prior to the 1992 enactment of the Civil Penalty Act, the NTSB
sometimes deferred to, but never considered itself bound by, FAA
interpretations.8 6 In order to identify the standard of deference, it is
necessary to consider cases where the NTSB failed to defer. In some
cases, the Board did not defer to the interpretation advanced by the FAA
and articulated various reasons for its decision.
In Administratorv. Thomas, a dispute arose over the interpretation of
"weather conditions" in the context of takeoff visibility under Instrument
81. Id. at 154.
82. Id. at 154-55.
83. Pub. L. No. 102-345, 106 Stat. 923 (1992) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 44703,
44709,46301(d) (1994)).
84. 49 U.S.C. §§ 44703(c)(2), 44709(d)(3), 46301(d)(5)(C) (1994).
85. 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d)(3).
86. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Enforcing Aviation Safety Regulations: The Case For a SplitEnforcementModel of.Agency Adjudication, 4 Admin. L.J. 389, 424 n.182 (1991).
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Flight Rules. 7 The FAA interpreted "weather conditions" to mean
officially reported weather conditions.8 8 The NTSB disagreed and
decided that "weather conditions" should not be limited to reported
weather conditions, but should include the pilot's own observation of the
prevailing visibility.89 The NTSB did not find the FAA's interpretation
unreasonable; it only indicated that the FAA interpretation was
unsupported by weather references in other sections of the FARs.
In Administrator v. Bowen, the Board refused to defer to the FAA
interpretation advanced at trial because it conflicted with the
interpretation developed during "genesis" of the rule.91 In Bowen, the
FAA claimed that Dominion Bizjets, Inc. was conducting passengercarrying flights for compensation or hire without a required part 135 air
carrier operating certificate because Dominion was charging "customers"
for the salaries of the flight crews.92 Generally, in this situation a pilot
may not carry passengers for compensation or hire unless the operation is
conducted in accordance with FAR Part 135.' 3 In specific circumstances,
however, a company may operate an aircraft carrying passengers and
charge them with specific costs, including fuel, oil, and landing fees.'
"Flight crew salaries" was not an approved cost specifically listed in the
FARs.95 Therefore, the FAA advocated that these flights were subject to
part 135 regulation. Because Dominion did not hold a part 135
operating certificate, the FAA claimed the flights were illegal.97 The
Board disagreed, finding instead that in its final rulemaking notice, the
FAA had indicated crew salaries would be allowed to be recovered.98
Nowhere did the Board state that the FAA's litigation interpretation was
implausible or unreasonable. Instead, it found that neither the pilot nor
87. 3 N.T.S.B. 3203,3202-04(1981).
88. Id. at 3204. The decision does not indicate that the FAA position was anything but a litigation
position.
89. Id
90. Id
91. 7 N.T.S.B. 1052, 1057 (1991); see also Davey, 3 N.T.S.B. 3164, 3165 (1980) (rejecting FAA
interpretation that varied from interpretation set forth by FAA in rulemaking proceeding).
92. Bowen, 7 N.T.S.B. at 1052, 1057.
93. 14 C.F.R. pt. 119 (1998).
94. Bowen, 7 N.T.S.B. at 1056-57.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1054.
97. Id. at 1052-54.

98. Id at 1057-58.
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the aviation community had been given notice of the interpretation
advanced at trial,99 and it deferred to the "more authoritative rulemaking
interpretation" encompassed within the regulatory history. 1 °
In Administrator v. Conley, the NTSB did not defer to the FAA
interpretation, but instead relied on Board precedent that showed a
preference for the Board's interpretation over the FAA's."' The FAA
had suspended Conley's commercial pilot certificate after he operated a
helicopter that, according to the FAA, had not met the requirements for
an annual maintenance inspection. 2 The ALJ reversed the
Administrator's suspension and the FAA appealed. 3 The Board
affirmed the AL's decision. 1 4
Conley involved two FARs. The first mandated that an aircraft cannot
be operated unless it has had an annual inspection, which involves a
completed inspection and approval for return to service by an authorized
inspector (AI),0 5 within the preceding twelve calendar months.'0 6 The
second required that an aircraft that has been altered or repaired 7 cannot
be used to carry passengers unless it has been approved for return to
service and checked in flight by a pilot.'0 8 In Conley, the helicopter had
been rebuilt prior to the annual inspection."° At the time of the incident
that led to this case, the inspection had been completed, but the AI
wanted Conley to perform a flight check before he signed the aircraft

99. The Board did not make this clear in its decision, although it hinted at it in a footnote. Id. at
1057 n.l1 (rejecting interpretation in favor of one provided during promulgation of rule). In a later
case, the Board explained that notice was the reason behind the decision in Bowen. See
Administrator v. Kraley, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4581, 4 (Aug. 18, 1997).
100. Bowen, 7 N.T.S.B. at 1057.
101. 3 N.T.S.B. 2236, 2237-38 (1980) (relying on Hawkins, 3 N.T.S.B. 1653 (1979), which held
that aircraft may be flown prior to completion of annual inspection).
102. Id. at 2236-37.
103. Id. at 2236.
104. Id. at 2237.
105. An aircraft is approved for return to service when an Al-an advanced type of aircraft
mechanic-certifies such and signs the aircraft logbooks with his name and certificate number.
106. Conley, 3 N.T.S.B. at 2236 n.2.
107. The applicable FAR, 14 C.F.R. § 91.167(a) (recodified at 14 C.F.RL § 91.407(b) (1998)),
addresses "an aircraft that has been repaired or altered in a manner that may have appreciably
changed its flight characteristics, or substantially affected its operation in flight." Conley, 3 N.T.S.B.
at 2238 n. 11.
108. Id. at2238.
109. Id. at 2237 n.6. The aircraft was thus subject to the requirements of 14 C.F.R. § 91.167(a)
(recodified at 14 C.F.1. § 91.407(b) (1998)). See supranote 107.

Validly Adopted FAA Interpretations
logbooks approving the helicopter for return to service."1 During the
flight check, the helicopter crashed.'
The FAA focused on the FAR that addressed annual inspections,
interpreting it to mean that an annual inspection is not complete until the
logbooks are signed."' Therefore, an aircraft could not be flown prior to
the signing of the logbooks." 3 Because the logbooks had not been
signed, the FAA claimed that the aircraft had not completed an annual
inspection in accordance with the FARs and therefore could not be
operated without a special flight permit." 4 The Board disagreed.
Designating the "sign off" a formality, it decided the annual inspection
had been completed even though the Al had not signed off the annual
inspection."' Furthermore, the Board concluded that the flight was
proper even though the annual inspection was incomplete' 16 because the
two required conditions after alteration-returning the aircraft to service
and flight-checking the aircraft-could be met concurrently because they
were listed in the conjunctive." 7 These cases, in which the Board viewed
the FAA interpretations as merely persuasive, illustrate the use of a
Skidmore standard."'
2.

Section 44709(d)(3) of the Civil PenaltyAdministrativeAssessment
Act of 1992

In 1992, the Civil Penalty Act codified the deferential relationship
between the NTSB and the FAA in aviation safety enforcement appeals
adjudicated by the NTSB." 9 The Act declared the Board bound by all
110. Bowen, 7 N.T.S.B. at 2237.
111. Id
112. Id. at2236.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2238.
115. Id. at2237.
116. Id. at 2238.
117. Id at 2237.
118. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
119. Pub. L. No. 102-345, 106 Stat 923 (1992) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§§ 44703(c)(2), 44709(d)(3), 46301(d)(5)(C) (1994)). Although it codified the deference standard,
the Civil Penalty Act's primary objective was to transfer appellate adjudicatory authority from the
FAA to the NTSB in FAA civil penalty actions against pilots, flight engineers, mechanics, and
repairmen. Full discussion of this Act is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a record of the final
House Aviation Subcommittee hearing at which the FAA, NTSB, and several interested
organizations testified, see generally Hearing,supra note 25.
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FAA interpretations

that are not arbitrary,

capricious, or inconsistent with the law.'

The "validly adopted"

terminology originated in Recommendation 91-8, which was issued by
the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS).'2
Recommendation 91-8 evolved from a congressionally-ordered ACUS
study and evaluation of the NTSB-FAA procedures concerning the
adjudication of civil penalty actions." Therein, the ACUS recommended
that the NTSB should be bound by all "validly adopted" FAA
interpretations that are not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.' 24
Recommendation 91-8 did not define "validly adopted," but only stated
that validly adopted interpretations should not include litigation
positions,"z which are interpretations advanced for the first time by the
FAA in an NTSB hearing.
120. With an arguably ambiguous term such as "validly adopted," the proper forum to conduct the
interpretation depends upon the legislative intent behind the statute. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). If this is determined to be a
pure statutory interpretation question, it is a matter for the court to determine "what the law is."
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421, 446 (1987) (holding that pure questions of statutory construction are decisions for court).
However, if the court finds that the legislature intended to delegate the interpretation to the agency,
then it is for the agency to determine the meaning of the statute and for the court to determine the
reasonableness of the interpretation. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. The proper forum inquiry is outside
the scope of this Comment.
If "validly adopted" is left to agency interpretation, the next inquiry becomes which agency is the
correct interpreter, the FAA or NTSB. This Comment argues that in this case, "valid adoption" is a
standard like "arbitrary, capricious," and therefore the NTSB will be the agency to determine
whether the FAA interpretation meets that standard. As the adjudicator, the NTSB is in a position
akin to a reviewing court, and therefore, it is the NTSB's responsibility to analyze the interpretation
against the applicable standard.
121. Although titled "Civil Penalty Administration Assessment Act," the Act's scope regarding
deference was not limited to civil penalty appeals. The NTSB is currently bound by "validly
adopted" interpretations in certificate action appeals, civil penalty appeals, and denial of certificate
application and renewal appeals. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 44703(c)(1) (certificate issuance or renewal
appeals), 44709(d)(3) (certificate action appeals), 46301(d)(5)(C) (civil penalty appeals) (1994).
122. 56 Fed. Reg. 67,139, 67,142-43 (1991); Administrative Conference of the United States,
Recommendations and Reports 1991, Recommendation 91-8. Adjudication of Civil Penalties Under
the Federal Aviation Act 44, [hereinafter ACUS Recommendation 91-8]. The ACUS was an
independent agency created to investigate and issue recommendations to improve federal agency
procedures. The ACUS was abolished Feb. 1, 1996 by the Treasury, Postal Service, and General
Government Appropriations Act, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-52, tit. IV, 109 Stat. 480, tit. IV (1995).
123. See Pub. L. No. 101-370 § 3(a), 104 Stat. 451, 452 (1990) (repealed by FAA Civil Penalty
Administrative Assessment Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-345, § 3, 106 Stat 923, 925-26).
124. 56 Fed. Reg. at 67,143; ACUS Recommendation 91-8, supra note 122, at 49.
125. "The [ACUS] recommends that validly adopted FAA interpretations of FAA regulations be
deferred to, unless such interpretations are arbitrary, capricious or not in accordance with

Validly Adopted FAA Interpretations
Addressing the Civil Penalty Act appeal provisions, the NTSB
suggested that it did not believe the Act significantly changed the
standard of deference it already afforded FAA interpretations.' 26 In
response to concerns regarding the new deference standard, the Board
declined to limit "validly adopted" interpretations to those subject to
notice and comment rulemaking, 27 reasoning that agencies are and
should be permitted to develop policy through means short of "formal
rulemaking."' 28 In addition, the Board declined to require that
interpretations commanding deference be developed only at the "highest
levels within the FAA."' 29 Rejecting such bright line rules, the Board
identified "the quality of the process through which an interpretation is
reached and the manner of its announcement" as key considerations
affecting "both the public interest and aviation safety dimensions" of its
review. 30 The Board cautioned that the domain of "validly adopted"
interpretations should be limited in at least one way: "hastily" and
"thinly" developed litigation positions should not bind the Board.' The
law.... This does not, however, mean that [the] NTSB should simply defer to litigation positions of
the FAA prosecutor." 56 Fed. Reg. at 67,142; ACUS Recommendation 91-8, supra note 122, at 47.
Litigation positions are generally not afforded deference because they could be post hoc
rationalizations of agency actions developed for the first time by agency counsel before the
reviewing appellate body. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S.
144, 156 (1990); see also Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204,212 (1988).
126. See Final Rules - NTSB Rules of Practice in Civil Penalty Proceedings, 59 Fed. Reg. 59,050,
59,053 (1994) ("As we noted to Congress during the considerations of these amendments, we do not
believe the amended language brings about any significant change in the relationship between FAA
and NTSB or to the kind and quality of deference to the Administrator's interpretations that has been
traditionally accorded."). However, the pre-statutory cases in which the NTSB did not defer do not
indicate that the NTSB felt "bound" by any FAA interpretations. See supra Part II.C.
127. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
128. Such a view (requiring notice and comment] requires the belief that Congress intended a
dramatic change in the administrative process as normally understood, and we decline to infer
any such intention without the support of clear evidence. Traditional administrative practice has
permitted the development of agency policy through a range of devices that fall short of formal
rulemaking, and the Board is given no specific authority to limit the Administrator's discretion
in this regard.
59 Fed. Reg. at 59,052-53. Notice and comment rulemaking is informal rulemaking, not formal
rulemaking. For discussion on the differences between formal and informal rulemaking, see ACUS
Guide, supra note 22, at 37-48.
129. 59 Fed. Reg. at 59,053. This suggestion was made by Aircraft Owners and Pilots
Association, with which the Board did not agree. Id. The Board's position suggests that it would
agree to be bound by interpretations developed by lower-level agency employees.
130. Id.
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Board's response, then, focused on the procedure used to develop
interpretations rather than on what level in the hierarchy the
interpretation is developed.
3.

Post-StatutoryDeference

NTSB adjudicatory decisions made after the Civil Penalty Act was
enacted indicate a more organized deference inquiry. While post-Act
Board decisions shed some light on what it considers to be "validly
adopted" documents, no clear definition of the term "validly adopted"
has emerged.
One area in which the deference question has been somewhat settled is
sanction disputes. In Administrator v. Reina,'32 the FAA had issued an
order suspending a pilot certificate for 120 days. At the initial NTSB
hearing, the ALJ reduced the sanction to a thirty-day suspension coupled
with a $500 civil penalty. 33 The FAA appealed to the full Board, which
then reinstated the 120-day suspension order.' The Board stated that
although it had authority to modify sanctions, its discretion was not
limitless.'3 5 The Board observed that, according to section 44709(d)(3),' 36
it was bound by all validly adopted interpretations including the FAA's
Enforcement Sanction Guidance Table'3 7 (Sanction Table). 3 ' The FAA's

13 I.Id. The Board also emphasized that Congress did not intend the deference standard to extend
to litigation positions, but there is no support for that claim in the authority cited by the NTSB. Id.
(citing H.R. Rep. No. 102-67 1, at 10 (1992)).
132. N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4508 (Dec. 6, 1996) modification and clarificationdenied,N.T.S.B.
Order No. EA-4552 (May 23, 1997) amended by N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4568 (July 11, 1997). For
other sanction disputes, see Administrator v. Kimsey, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4537 (Mar. 25, 1997),
and Administrator v. Oliver, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4505 (Dec. 4, 1996).
133. Reina, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4508, at 2.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 3.
136. Actually, the Board cited 49 U.S.C. § 44703, but later clarified that it was referring to 49
U.S.C. § 44709. See Reina, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4568 (July 11, 1997) (amending N.T.S.B. Order
No. EA-4508 (Dec. 6, 1996) and N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4552 (May 23, 1997)).
137. Enforcement Handbook supranote 25, at app. 4.
138. Reina, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4508, at 3. Although the NTSB has repeatedly stated that the
Sanction Table is validly adopted, it has failed to articulate its reasoning behind that finding. See,
e.g., Administrator v. Oliver, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4505, 2 (Dec. 4, 1996) (stating Board is
generally bound by validly adopted interpretations of laws and regulations, which include
Administrator's sanction guidance table); Administrator v. Finnell, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4427
(Feb. 20, 1996) (holding, pursuant to § 44709(d)(3), Board bound by Administrator's written
sanction policy guidance as well as all validly adopted interpretations).

654
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120-day suspension order was consistent with the Sanction Table as well
40
as Board precedent;' 39 therefore, the NTSB was bound to defer.
Nonetheless, the NTSB has held that the FAA must offer the Sanction
Table into the hearing record for it to be binding. For example, in cases
in which the issue on appeal was sanction modification, and the FAA
failed to offer the Sanction Table into the hearing record, the NTSB
41
accorded it no deference.
The NTSB has also affirmed its previously stated position that
litigation positions should not be binding. 42 In Administratorv. Smith &
Wright, the Board determined that the finding of a violation could not
stand because the FAA's interpretation of an aircraft clearance regulation43
was a litigation position that was not binding or entitled to deference.
The Board found that the regulatory language did not support the FAA's
interpretation, and noted that the FAA had offered no other supporting
documentary evidence.'" In addition, the Board decided that the FAA
interpretation was unclear. 45 Finally, the Board found that the FAA had
taken an initial position that could not be reconciled with its current
litigation position. 46 The combination of these factors convinced the
Board that it was not bound by the FAA's interpretation. The Board,
however, did not elucidate upon which part of section 44709(d)(3) its
decision was founded: the interpretation's lack of validity in adoption or
the arbitrariness of the rule.
139. Reina, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4508, at 5.
140. See id.; see also Oliver,N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4505.
141. See, e.g., Administrator v. Gartner, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4623 (Feb. 11, 1998);
Administrator v. Kimsey, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4537 (Mar. 25, 1997); Administrator v. Sanders,
N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4470 (July 17, 1996); Administrator v. Stange, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA4375 (June 29, 1995).
142. See Administrator v. Merrell, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4670, 3 (June 3, 1998); Gartner,
N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4623, at 3; Administrator v. Krachun, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4002, 5 (Oct.
21, 1993). This does not imply that the NTSB will never defer to FAA interpretations advanced
through litigation; it only means that litigation positions should persuade, not bind. If the NTSB
agrees with the FAA litigation position, it should defer to it but not consider itself bound by it.
143. N.T.S.B. OrderNo. EA-4169, 2,6-10 (May 13, 1994).
144. l at 8-10. In Krachun, the Board held that "deference cannot be readily accorded in the
context of a hastily-developed record that is sustained solely by argument of counsel." N.T.S.B.
Order No. EA-4002, at 5. The Board emphasized that this was particularly so when the argument
was not supported by "practice, precedent, or explicit documentation, and where it entails
consequences not only for respondent, but for the aviation community generally." Id. at 5-6. This
statement hints at a notice requirement.
145. Smith & Wright, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4169, at 7.
146. Id. at 8.
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In a later case, Administrator v. Foss, the Board deferred to an
apparent litigation position of the FAA. Foss involved the decisional
responsibilities of a pilot carrying parachutists. 4 7 The parachutists had
descended through clouds while conducting their jumps, an act forbidden
by the FARs. 48 Foss, the pilot, had deferred to the parachutists onboard
in determining whether the jump should continue, and had not "actively
participate[d] in the decision-making" himself.'49 The FAA interpreted
the FARs to impose a "dual responsibility for the pilot and the
parachutists to ascertain that the parachutists can adhere to cloud
clearance requirements."'50 The Board deferred to the FAA's
interpretation, but reasoned that Foss had not advocated a "compelling
reason" for the Board to reject the FAA's interpretation.' The Board
stated that the FAA's interpretation was not arbitrary or capricious.' 52
The Board acknowledged that it was bound by validly adopted FAA
interpretations; however, the Board used language in its opinion
indicating that although it agreed with the FAA's interpretation, it did
not consider itself bound. Furthermore, the Board did not discuss
whether the FAA's interpretation was validly adopted-it merely stated
that it was obviously correct.'53 Thus, although the Board deferred to
what was apparently an interpretation developed in anticipation of
litigation, Foss does not appear to alter the Board's position that it is not
bound by such interpretations."
Recently, the NTSB indicated that it would recognize as validly
adopted only written FAA policy that gives notice to airmen.
Administrator v. Merrell involved a Northwest Airlines pilot, Merrell,
who acknowledged an air traffic control (ATC) clearance intended for an
American Airlines flight.'55 Merrell mistakenly believed that the ATC

147. N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4631, 3 (Feb. 5, 1998).
148. Id. at 2. The applicable FAR, 14 C.F.R. § 105.29, stated that "[n]o person may make a
paiachute jump, and no pilot in command of an aircraft may allow a parachute jump to be made from
that aircraft... [i]nto or through a cloud." Id. at 2 n.2.
149. Id. at 5.
150. Id. at4.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 5.
154. A later case emphasizes that "litigating positions are not necessarily 'validly adopted
interpretations.., of written agency policy guidance available to the public."' Administrator v.
Gartner, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4623, 3 (Feb. 11, 1988).
155. N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4670, 2 (June 3,1998).
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call was intended for his flight, and answered ATC at the same time the
appropriate American flight responded." 6 At the initial hearing, neither
party disputed that the transmission was squelched and the ATC tape
indicated that two aircraft responded to the ATC instruction at the same
time.5 7 The ALJ dismissed the case based on NTSB precedent that,
assuming the mistake was not caused by carelessness, excuses a pilot
who mishears an ATC clearance, follows the correct procedure by
reading back the clearance, and acts upon the mistaken clearance if no
ATC correction is received.'
The FAA appealed, claiming that a
violation of regulations prohibiting careless operations and operations
counter to ATC instructions had occurred and that the NTSB was bound
to defer to the FAA's interpretation under section 44709.159 The Board
disagreed, determining the FAA's interpretation was merely a litigation
position that did not demand deference. 6 ° The Board stated that it was
not required to defer because the FAA's position was not encompassed
within any adopted rule or "written discussion, adopted as FAA policy,
with notice to airmen."'' Thus, Merrell indicates that the NTSB may
require a validly adopted FAA interpretation to be written FAA policy
that gives notice to airmen. This is the Board's most explicit statement to
date concerning its position on the meaning of "validly adopted."
In the only post-statutory deference case that has been decided by a
court on appeal, Hinson v. NTSB, the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit admonished the NTSB for not directly addressing the question of
deference. 62 The FAA petitioned the court to review the NTSB's
reversal of a ninety-day pilot certificate suspension. The court denied the
FAA's petition because the FAA, by neglecting to articulate its
interpretations in the proceedings below, failed to preserve its statutory
deference objection for appeal.'63 The court stated, however, that
Congress had clearly and unambiguously directed the NTSB to defer to

156. Id.
157. Id
158. Id.
159. Id at 1 & n.1, 2. In Merrell, the regulations at issue were 14 C.F.RL § 91.123(b), (e) (1998),
and § 91.13(a) (1998).
160. Id at3.
161. Id
162. 57 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The NTSB Order was Administrator v. Rolund,
N.T.S.B. OrderNo. EA-4123 (Mar. 17, 1994).
163. Hinson, 57 F.3d at 1151.
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FAA interpretations of the FARs.'" The court emphasized that the Board
had specifically found that the FAA interpretation was not arbitrary,
capricious, or contrary to law, and therefore the Board should have been
bound by that interpretation, provided it was "validly adopted."' 65 The
court did not answer the question of whether the interpretation was
"validly adopted" because the FAA had failed to preserve that argument
for appeal. 66 Although it chastised the FAA for not raising this
argument, the court found:
[It is] both puzzling and disturbing that in a case where important
air traffic safety issues are implicated, the Board apparently did not
even inquire into, much less consider itself bound by, the FAA's
interpretation of the applicable regulations, in the face of a clear
statutory directive to defer to reasonable, validly adopted FAA
interpretations. 67
In sum, the deferential relationship between the FAA and NTSB is
governed by the Civil Penalty Act, and is not subject to common law
doctrine. 16 ' The Chevron and Skidmore decisions, however, are relevant
as background for interpreting the statute. According to these cases,
169
while interpretations advanced through legislative rules are binding,
under Skidmore, less formal interpretations are generally given only
persuasive weight by courts of law.17
The Civil Penalty Act determines the degree of deference required by
the NTSB in FAA certificate actions. This Act indicates a level of
deference above that articulated in Skidmore. According to the NTSB
cases decided after the Act, the Board will defer to some FAA
interpretations such as the Sanction Guidance Table. The NTSB also
reiterated that it will not be bound by stances taken during litigation.
Unfortunately, these two positions provide little guidance in ascertaining

164. Id.
165. Id. at 1147-48.
166. Id. at 1148.
167. Id.
168. In Hinson, the court of appeals explicitly stated that the statutory language, not common law
doctrine, determines the NTSB-FAA deference issue. Id. at n.2.
169. See Beazer East, Inc. v. EPA, 963 F.2d 603, 606 (3d Cir. 1992) ("[Regulations] have the
force and effect of law and must be promulgated in accordance with the proper procedures under
the APA.").
170. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
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to which interpretations the Board must defer. This determination turns
on the definition of "validly adopted" as used in the Civil Penalty Act.
III. DETERMINING WHICH FAA INTERPRETATIONS ARE
"VALIDLY ADOPTED"
The Civil Penalty Act states that FAA interpretations must satisfy a
two-part test to bind the NTSB. First, interpretations must be validly
adopted."' Second, validly adopted interpretations must not be arbitrary,
capricious, or otherwise not according to the law.'72 If an interpretation
fails to satisfy either of these requirements, it does not bind the NTSB.' 73
Arguably, one could read the statute as a one part test: "validly
adopted" means "not arbitrary or capricious." But were one to do this,
the words "validly adopted" would be unnecessarily included. 74 It would
have sufficed to bind the NTSB to "all FAA interpretations not arbitrary,
capricious, or not according to the law." The fact that Congress qualified
"interpretations" with "validly adopted" must mean that the test has two
parts, with "validly adopted" referring to the interpretation development
process, and "not arbitrary, capricious" referring to the substance of the
interpretation.
The real question, of course, is not when the NTSB will be bound, but
when the public will be bound by FAA interpretations. Because validly
adopted FAA interpretations bind the NTSB, these interpretations in turn
bind the aviation community. Thus, the question of which interpretations
are "validly adopted" must be considered from the standpoint of pilots,
aircraft mechanics, and all others involved in aviation.
"Validly adopted" can be defined in various ways. "Validly adopted"
interpretations could be limited to include only legislative rules.
Alternatively, "validly adopted" could be read broadly to include all
reasonable FAA interpretations originating in any FAA office. Finally,
171. 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d)(3) (1994).
172. 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d)(3).
173. It is important to distinguish between situations where the NTSB defers to an interpretation
and situations where it is bound by an interpretation. Just because an interpretation is not binding
does not mean the Board cannot defer to it or otherwise agree with it. The Board is free to defer to all
FAA interpretations that are not arbitrary or capricious, if it so chooses. Only validly adopted
interpretations actually bind the NTSB, leaving it with no deferential discretion.
174. "It is an elementary rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every word,
clause and sentence of a statute." 2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction 119 (5th
ed. 1992).
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"validly adopted" interpretations could encompass any combination of
interpretations that lies between these two extremes.
A.

The NarrowAlternative: Only Legislative Rules Bind the NTSB

Only legislative rules can bind the public. 75 One approach, following
this logic, would be to consider legislative rules, the FARs, "validly
adopted," and find any interpretation less formal than a legislative rule
not "validly adopted."' 7 6
In enacting the Civil Penalty Act, however, Congress specifically
bound the NTSB to interpretations that are "validly adopted"--not
"validly adopted legislative rules" or "interpretations subject to notice
and comment under the APA." This less restrictive terminology suggests
that the meaning of "validly adopted" is not limited to interpretations
contained in the FAA's legislative rules.
The FAA is the aviation safety policymaking agency, and nonlegislative rules.77 are an important vehicle the FAA uses to develop
policy.' The aviation industry requests daily interpretive guidance in
order to ascertain whether its operations are conducted properly.'7 9 In
response to this, the FAA issues numerous less formal interpretations
every year upon which the aviation industry relies. 8 '
If one defines "validly adopted interpretations" as interpretations that
are binding under the APA, the NTSB might not uphold existing
interpretive guidance short of legislative rules. As a result, the aviation
community might have less confidence in FAA guidance on the meaning
of the FARs, leaving pilots, mechanics, and others without dependable
direction on how to perform their duties. Consequently, conflicting
practices could result and aviation safety could-be compromised.

175. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(holding only legislative rules establish binding norms); see also Davis & Pierce, supra note 22,
§ 6.3, at 233-34, § 6.5, at 250.
176. According to the NTSB, certain commentators have supported this view. 59 Fed. Reg.
59,050, 59,052 (1994). Although the FAA does not promulgate formal rules in accordance with
5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557, formal rules promulgated under these sections would be binding and therefore
validly adopted.
177. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
179. Interview with Karl Lewis, Supervising Attorney, FAA, in Renton, Wash. (Feb. 20, 1998).
180. See supra note 29-32 and accompanying text.
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Taken to the extreme, the NTSB would become a co-policymaking

agency because it would be implementing aviation safety policy when
interpreting the FARs through adjudication. Although policy may be

implemented through adjudication,"'1 in this case it would be effectuated

by an agency that is not authorized to develop that policy. In Martin v.
OccupationalSafety and Health Review Commission, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that because Congress had not delegated policymaking

authority to the adjudicating agency, Congress could not have "expected
[that agency] to use its adjudicatory power to play a policymaking
role."' 82 Congress has not delegated aviation safety policymaking
authority to the NTSB, so the NTSB should be bound by the full range of
FAA policymaking authority. Interpretations subject to notice and
comment rulemaking should not be considered the sole body of validly
adopted interpretations.
B.

The BroadAlternative: Presumptive Validity ofAll Interpretations

Arguably, section 44709(d)(3) could be read broadly to state that
validly adopted interpretations are all those not arbitrary, capricious, or
contrary to law-in other words, all reasonable interpretations. 8 3 Under
such a broad reading, any FAA interpretation consistent with the
regulation and therefore reasonable, or not clearly erroneous, would bind
the NTSB. This definition would include any interpretation the agency

issues, regardless of its form or origin, as long as it was not arbitrary or
capricious. Although straightforward, such a broad approach has

significant shortcomings.
First, this approach would generate, and even sanction, inconsistency.

For example, one regional FAA office could issue an interpretation of a
181. See Union Flights, Inc. v. FAA, 957 F.2d 685, 688 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290-95 (1974)) ("Administrative agencies are generally free to
announce new principles during adjudication."); Administrator v. Miller, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA3581, 4 (Apr. 28, 1992) ("While the evolutionary interpretation of rules is thought to be better
accomplished through the rulemaking process itself, there is little question that the adjudicatory
process may also be used to develop and define the meaning of existing regulations.").
182. 499 U.S. 144, 154 (1990).
183. In fact, when addressing the House of Representatives on the day the House passed the Civil
Penalty Act, Representative Hammerschmidt only mentioned the arbitrary, capricious standard, with
no reference to any type of further adoption process: "I would like to make clear... that if the Board
finds that [the] FAA is interpreting its laws and regulations.., in an arbitrary or capricious manner,
then the Board is not obliged to follow the FAA's approach." 138 Cong. Rec. H7238 (daily ed. Aug.
3, 1992) (statement of Rep. Hammerschmidt).
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particular FAR that is inconsistent with another regional office's
interpretation of the same FAR. If the first region's interpretation had
bound the NTSB in a past appellate adjudication, there would be no
assurance that the Board would defer to the second region's conflicting
interpretation of the same regulation in a separate proceeding. This
would lead to an inconsistent application of the regulations. Aviation is
an inherently national and international activity; thus, aviation safety is
not solely a local concern. Interpretations that do not follow a standard
process will add more confusion to that already generated by vague
regulations. This is an undesirable result when important air safety issues
are involved.
Second, this approach is procedurally unfair. Under such a reading,
even hastily developed litigation positions not found to be arbitrary or
capricious would be considered "validly adopted.""' Courts do not
ordinarily accord deference to litigation positions classified as post-hoc
rationalizations.'8 5 Likewise, the NTSB does not defer to litigation
positions because they provide the aviation community with no notice.'86
Therefore, such a broad reading is not acceptable.
IV. PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR VALID ADOPTION
Interpretations should be given deference if they are substantively and
procedurally fair. The statutory language neatly sets out the criteria for
achieving such fairness.
Substantive fairness will result through application of the second half
of the criterion established by Congress: not arbitrary, capricious, or
contrary to law. l8 7 It is well established that agency interpretations must

184. But see Martin, 499 U.S. at 157 (stating that Secretary of Labor's interpretation of its
regulation "embodied in a citation" is "agency action, not apost hoc rationalization of it" and under
these circumstances litigation positions are as much exercises of delegated lawmaking powers as
promulgation of regulations).
185. See id. at 156 (finding litigation positions not entitled to deference when they are merely
counsel's post hoc rationalizations for agency action); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S.
204,212 (1988) (holding deference is not given to wholly unsupported agency litigation positions).
186. See, e.g., Administrator v. Kraley, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4581, 4 (Aug. 18, 1997) (citing
Bowen, 7 N.T.S.B. 1052 (1991)) (declining to enforce FAA interpretation against pilot because "no
notice [had been given] to him or the aviation community").
187. See 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d)(3) (1994).
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be reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious.' 88 Arbitrary, capricious
interpretations should not be given NTSB deference, as directed by the
Civil Penalty Act.
Procedural fairness will be achieved through the adoption process
itself, which should satisfy two requirements: uniformity and notice.
Without uniform interpretations, certain affected individuals will be
operating under conflicting presumptions regarding the meaning of the
FARs. In addition, affected individuals should have notice of the
interpretations that bind them. Thus, the FAA may issue validly adopted
interpretations if they are developed pursuant to an established procedure
that incorporates these elements.
1.

Uniformity: DelegatedDevelopment

Aviation safety requires uniformity of interpretation, which is the very
purpose of section 44709(d)(3). Without uniform rules and
interpretations thereof, conflicting practices, in aviation may have
dangerous consequences. The number of informal interpretations issued
by the FAA evinces the existing uncertainty in the meaning of the
FARs. 8 9 Many times, vague FARs need further clarification. Without
such clarification, airmen could interpret FARs in different ways, leading
to uncertainty and contradicting practices that could inhibit aviation
safety. For example, conflicting interpretations between FAA field
offices could cause a Seattle-based pilot to understand a particular FAR
to mean something different than would a Chicago-based pilot. In
extreme cases, accidents could occur before conflicts were resolved.
Further interpretation conflicts also arise between the FAA and the
NTSB, as the statute at issue suggests. 9 This uncertainty would be
minimized by requiring one set of standard, uniform interpretations upon
which all parties could rely.' 9'

188. See, e.g., Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735,739 (1996); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers,
453 U.S. 34,44 (1981).
189. See supra note 29.
190. See, e.g., Hinson v. NTSB, 57 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Administrator v. Merrell,
N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4670 (June 3, 1998); Bowen, 7 N.T.S.B. 1052 (1991).
191. This is not to imply that the interpretations will be rigid and unchanging. An agency's
interpretation may, and at times should, change over time to meet the present needs of the public. See
Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 517 (1994) (holding Secretary is not
estopped from changing interpretation if Secretary believes change is necessary):
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To achieve uniformity, all "validly adopted" interpretations should be
issued pursuant to authority delegated by the Administrator. The
Administrator may delegate the interpretive responsibility to the agency
subdivision that possesses rulemaking responsibility for the specified
area of regulation. 92 More than one organization responsible for
rulemaking may exist, but only one subdivision should have that
authority for each "set" of regulations. For example, all interpretations of
regulations within part 67 of the FARs (medical standards) should be
issued by the Federal Air Surgeon within the FAA.
Assigning interpretive authority to the organization that develops the
regulations is logical and practical. The designated organizations are
most familiar with the intended meaning of the regulations, and should
therefore be able to develop corresponding interpretations in the most
cost-effective and efficient way. This procedure will also ensure that
only one interpretation of a regulation will be issued officially and bind
the NTSB. 93 Requiring uniformity satisfies the first factor the NTSB
stated it would consider: the quality of the process through which an
interpretation is reached. 94
2.

Notice: PublicationandDissemination to the Public

When an agency intends to bind the public, it must provide notice of
that which will bind."5 Because "validly adopted" FAA interpretations
will bind the NTSB, they will bind the public as well. The public must
therefore have notice of such interpretations, especially because the
public will not be given an opportunity to comment, as it is given when

192. The Administrator has the power to "delegate, and authorize successive redelegations of, to
an officer or employee of the Administration any function, power, or duty conferred upon the
Administrator, unless such delegation is prohibited by law." 49 U.S.C.S. § 106(f)(2)(C) (1997).
Within the agency are various organizations, or subdivisions, such as Flight Standards Service,
Aircraft Certification Service, and the Office of Aviation Medicine.
193. Additionally, field offices must be made aware that although they may advise the public of
an interpretation, to be considered binding it must pass through the subdivision possessing authority
delegated by the Administrator.
194. 59 Fed. Reg. 59,050, 59,053 (1994).
195. See Administrator v. Merrell, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4670, 3 (June 3, 1998) ("[T"he FAA
has here offered us no evidence of any policy guidance written by the FAA, validly adopted or
otherwise, for the proposition it argues here.... [l]t offers no written discussion, adopted as FAA
policy, with notice to airmen, that discusses the circumstances [under which a violation here would

not be found].") (emphasis added).
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FARs are promulgated.196 The notice provided must be both available
and understandable. Requiring notice satisfies the second factor the
NTSB stated it would consider: the manner in which an interpretation is
19 7
developed.
The public should be given notice beyond that provided by the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)'98 and the Federal Register. While
the constructive notice these sources provide may suffice for other
purposes, in a scheme where the public is to be bound by agency
interpretations without being given the opportunity to comment,
constructive notice is not enough. There is no guarantee that a majority
of individuals subject to the FARs are even aware of the FOIA, or that
agency documents may be obtained pursuant to it.' In addition,
although publication of interpretive rules in the Federal Register satisfies
legal notice requirements, from a practical standpoint this is inadequate
for the aviation community. Generally, even if they are aware of its
existence, pilots and mechanics do not read the Federal Register. Notice
must be provided through a commonly known, easily accessible source.
The NTSB has emphasized the importance of notice in several ways.
The Board considers the manner in which interpretations are announced
when determining if an interpretation is "validly adopted.,, 200 The Board
has held that regulations must be specific enough to notify individuals
that if the regulations are violated, the individual will suffer punitive
FAA action. 20 ' To extend this NTSB position in a practical way,
individuals must be able to understand the meaning of the regulations if
they are to be bound by them. The FAA may need to interpret vague
regulations in order to impart the specificity demanded by the NTSB.

196. Because the FARs are informal rules, they are subject to the notice and comment provisions

of 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1994).
197. See 59 Fed. Reg. 59,050, 59,053 (1994).
198. All agency adopted interpretations not published in the Federal Register are required to be
"available for public inspection and copying." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (Supp. H 1996). Additionally,
interpretations developed after 1996 are required to be available to the public through "computer
telecommunications or... other electronic means." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2).
199. Arguably, interpretations are available to the public through non-governmental publications.
See, e.g., Joseph D. Kuchta, FederalAviation Decisions, Compilation of Civil Penalty and Chief
Counsel Interpretations(1993). However, the responsibility of notice provision should rest squarely
on the FAA and not be left to outside sources. See supra note 195.
200. See 59 Fed. Reg. at 59053.
201. See Conley, 3 N.T.S.B. 2236, 2258 n.12 (1980) (citing Babbitt, 1 N.T.S.B. 1305, 1307

(1971)).
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Any adoption process short of requiring notice of understandable
interpretations would violate principles of procedural fairness.
The FAA should publish 20 2 all "validly adopted" interpretations in
both an official publication and on the FAA's Internet Web site0 3 in
order to provide the most people with actual notice and access. While
publication in the Federal Register need not be required, publication in a
designated official source should be required. This source should be
widely publicized among and available to the aviation community. One
possibility would be to publish a quarterly "Interpretation Bulletin"
listing validly adopted interpretations developed during that quarter.
Posting the interpretations on the FAA's Internet Web site would provide
an efficient, far-reaching distribution process that can be accessed easily
at little cost to the public. Using the Internet would demand minimal
agency time and expense. The 1996 amendment to the FOIA, which
requires publication of agency interpretations issued after November 1,
1996 "by computer telecommunications or... other electronic means,"
strongly supports Internet utilization."'
To provide adequate notice, the interpretation distribution process
must be well known in the aviation community, and interpretations must
be widely available. Certificated individuals should be notified first by
mail that validly adopted FAA interpretations of the FARs will be
available to them via the Internet and Interpretation Bulletin. Thereafter,
an individual should be given the opportunity to receive the
Interpretation Bulletin quarterly by mail if she chooses. This practical
process ensures that more affected members of the public will receive
notice of binding FAA interpretations than would be accomplished
through the traditional legal methods.20 5 Increasing the number of
individuals who receive notice will ensure greater understanding of and
uniformity in application of the FARs, ultimately leading to safer skies.
202. This is not the first time that there has been a call for publication of interpretations. The
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association submitted a written statement to the House of
Representatives aviation subcommittee suggesting this very idea to prevent overreaching by the
FAA. Hearing, supra note 25, at 487-88 (written statement of John Yodice, General Counsel,
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association).
203. FederalAviation Administration(visited Aug. 5, 1998) <http://www.faa.gov>.
204. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. I 1996) (mandating that agency cannot rely on, use, or
cite as precedent interpretations created on or after Nov. 1, 1996, unless agency publishes and offers
it for sale or makes it available via "computer telecommunications" by Nov. 1, 1997). To date the
FAA has not posted its interpretations on its Web site.
205. The traditional legal methods include the Federal Register and FOIA. See supra note 198 and
accompanying text.
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V.

CONCLUSION

In certificate actions, the FAA Civil Penalty Administrative
Assessment Act of 1992 directs the NTSB to defer to all "validly
adopted" FAA interpretations that are not arbitrary, capricious, or
contrary to the law. 0 6 The phrase "validly adopted" remains undefined
by Congress, the courts, and the administrative agencies. By including
this phrase in the Civil Penalty Act, Congress must have intended validly
adopted interpretations to include more than those interpretations
promulgated as informal rules under the APA, but less than every
interpretation put forth by the FAA.
Validly adopted interpretations should be both substantively and
procedurally fair. On its face, the statute provides for both fairness
aspects in the form of a two-part analysis. First, it requires that
interpretations must not be arbitrary or capricious, ensuring substantive
fairness. Second, a valid adoption process ensures procedural fairness.
The adoption process should establish a uniform body of FAA
interpretations, adequate notice of which must be given to affected
individuals. Any process that falls short of this standard will jeopardize,
rather than enhance, aviation safety.

206. 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d)(3) (1994).
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